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JURISDICTIONALITY AND BOWLES V. RUSSELL 
Scott Dodson* 
On June 14, 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bowles v. Russell,1 a 
case watched primarily by procedure geeks but one which may have enor-
mous impact for courts and litigators.  It addressed a ubiquitous but confus-
ing question of jurisdictional characterization:  when is a limitation 
“jurisdictional,” and when is it not?  Litigators encounter these questions all 
the time in statutory coverage issues, in time limitations, and in a host of 
other preconditions.  Whether a particular limitation is jurisdictional or not 
can be an important question, for jurisdictional limitations are not subject to 
waiver or equitable exceptions, may be raised at any time, and obligate 
courts to monitor and raise them sua sponte.  In Bowles, the Court held that 
the statutory time limitation for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 
I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF BOWLES 
Keith Bowles was convicted of murder in Ohio and unsuccessfully ap-
pealed through the state court system.  He filed a federal habeas corpus peti-
tion, which was denied by the district court on September 9, 2003.  He did 
not appeal within the required 30 day period, but in December timely 
moved to reopen the period during which he could file his notice of appeal.  
His motion was granted by the district court on February 10, 2004.2   
In its order, the district court gave Bowles seventeed days—until Feb-
ruary 27—to file his notice of appeal.  Bowles filed on February 26.3  The 
problem is that while 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) authorizes a district court to re-
open and extend the time to appeal, it limits that extension period to four-
teen days.  Thus, Bowles’s notice of appeal was timely under the district 
court’s order but untimely under § 2107(c). 
The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.4  The 
Supreme Court, in a brief 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Thomas, af-
firmed. 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law.  This essay previews some of 
the commentary on Bowles v. Russell and removal in my article “In Search of Removal Jurisdiction,” 
forthcoming in Northwestern University Law Review. 
1  127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007) (link). 
2  Id. at 2362. 
3  Id. 
4  Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Justice Thomas began by asserting:  “This Court has long held that the 
taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdic-
tional.’”5  That has been so particularly for statutory time limits because 
Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the courts’ jurisdiction.  
In § 2107, Congress “specifically limited the amount of time by which dis-
trict courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period.”6  Accordingly, for Jus-
tice Thomas, that meant that the time period of § 2107(c) is jurisdictional 
and not susceptible to the equitable exception sought by Bowles. 
Justice Thomas also reasoned that a jurisdictional characterization 
“makes good sense.”  He wrote:  “If rigorous rules like the one applied to-
day are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to prom-
ulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.” 
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, decried the unfair result of precluding Bowles’s appeal when he 
filed within the time allowed by the district judge:  “It is intolerable for the 
judicial system to treat people this way, and there is not even a technical 
justification for condoning this bait and switch.”7  In addition, Justice 
Souter noted that recent opinions of the Court have stepped back from strict 
adherence to jurisdictional characterizations and have called into question 
the precedent that Justice Thomas relied upon.  Under that trend, he argued, 
the limitation in § 2107(c) should not be viewed as jurisdictional.  Accord-
ingly, he would find an equitable exception available to Bowles. 
II. WHERE BOWLES GOES WRONG 
At a first glance of Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court, the issues 
seem relatively straightforward and the result reasonable.  But, as Justice 
Souter points out in dissent, there is far more at stake than just the jurisdic-
tionality of § 2107(c).  By eliding the complexity and far reach of jurisdic-
tional characterization issues, Bowles creates tension with precedent and 
increases the risk of wasted litigant and judicial resources.  
A. Doctrinal Inconsistency and Uncertainty 
Justice Souter was correct to note that prior to Bowles, recent decisions 
had identified rampant misuse of the term “jurisdictional,” and that the 
Court had tried to curtail that misuse by providing clearer guidelines as to 
when a limit was jurisdictional or not.8 
 
5  Id. at 2363. 
6  Id. at 2366. 
7  Id. at 2367 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
8  See., e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007) (link) (ad-
mitting that phrases from precedent using the term “jurisdiction” were “less than ‘felicitously’ crafted”); 
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242 (2006) (link) (confessing that the Court had “sometimes 
been profligate in its use of the term [jurisdictional]”); Eberhart v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 403, 407 (2005) 
(link) (per curiam) (noting that the lower court’s improper characterization of a federal rule as jurisdic-
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The first guideline concerned whether the limit was phrased in jurisdic-
tional terms.  If so, the presumption was that the limit was jurisdictional.  If 
not, then the presumption was that the limit was not.9 
The next guideline entailed looking at the limit and classifying it either 
as a “claim-processing rule,” which generally was not jurisdictional, or a 
line that separates “classes of cases,” which generally was.10  For example, 
the Court had characterized as nonjurisdictional “claim-processing rules” 
both Bankruptcy Rule 4004, which gives a Chapter 7 creditor sixty days af-
ter the first date set for the meeting of creditors to file a complaint objecting 
to the debtor’s discharge,11 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
33(b)(2), which sets a time deadline to file a motion for a new trial.12  The 
Court contrasted these nonjurisdictional limits with “prescriptions delineat-
ing the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (per-
sonal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”13 
Bowles sweeps these decisions aside as distinguishable and dismisses 
the framework that they erected as mere dicta.  But Justice Thomas does not 
explain why the framework would not be valuable for § 2107.  Instead, Jus-
tice Thomas distinguishes those cases on the ground that they dealt with 
federal rules as opposed to statutes.  He is right that they are distinguish-
able, but he is wrong to use that distinction as a reason to discard the help-
ful guidance provided by those cases.  Those cases developed the guidance 
to apply broadly and to signal a willingness to revisit, in a principled way, 
prior decisions’ loose use of the term “jurisdictional” to describe certain 
limits.14  Instead of explaining why the guidance was not appropriate in this 
case, however, Justice Thomas simply refused to apply it and relied instead 
on the very same prior decisions that had used the term “jurisdictional” 
loosely.  Justice Souter is right:  “By its refusal to come to grips with our 
considered statements of law the majority leaves the Court incoherent.”15 
At the same time, Justice Thomas failed to adopt any substitute guid-
ance other than the fact that the limit was expressed in a statute.  I agree that 
rules adopted under the Rules Enabling Act are different than statutes in 
                                                                                                                           
tional “is an error shared among the circuits, and that is was caused in large part by imprecision in our 
prior cases”); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (link) (“Courts, including this Court, it is true, 
have been less than meticulous . . . ; they have more than occasionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to 
describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court.”). 
9  Arbaugh, 126 S. Ct. at 1245. 
10  Eberhart, 126 S. Ct. at 405–06; Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. 
11  See Kontrick, 540 U.S. 443. 
12  See Eberhart, 126 S. Ct. 403.  In another case, the Court had characterized the Equal Access to 
Justice Act’s time limit for an applicant to seek attorney’s fees against the U.S. government as a non-
jurisdictional restriction on a “mode of relief.”  Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 405 (2004) 
(link). 
13  Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. 
14  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
15  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2370 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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“jurisdictionally significant”16 ways because Congress can restrict judicial 
jurisdiction by statute.17  But just because Congress can does not mean that 
it does so in all cases.  Not all statutory limits are jurisdictional limits.18  
Justice Thomas does not say what it is about § 2107 that makes it jurisdic-
tional and what it is about, say, Title VII’s time limit for filing a complaint 
that makes it nonjurisdictional.19  After Bowles, lower courts will be left to 
wonder how to determine the jurisdictionality of other statutory limits. 
The removal statute, for example, may be a limit with which the courts 
soon wrestle.  Every single circuit court to rule on the characterization of 
the § 1446 requirement—that a notice of removal be filed within 30 days 
after service—has held it to be nonjurisdictional.20  Likewise, every circuit 
to publish an opinion on the characterization of the § 1446 requirement that 
a notice of removal based on diversity be filed within one year has held it to 
be nonjurisdictional.21  After Bowles, courts adopting a nonjurisdictional 
characterization of § 1446 will have to reconsider that characterization 
(though, as I suggest elsewhere,22 Bowles need not be considered a control-
ling case if put in its proper place within a broader framework).  Removal is 
just one area that is certain to become more confused after Bowles. 23 
B. Increased Risk of Wasted Resources 
Bowles reverses a presumption of nonjurisdictionality imposed in prior 
cases, to the detriment of litigants and the courts.  Previously, only Con-
gress’s explicit designation of a statutory limit as jurisdictional raised a pre-
sumption of jurisdictionality,24 and for good reason:  as a matter of 
separation of powers, the courts must defer to Congress’s delineations of ju-
risdiction, for Congress wields the constitutional power to monitor jurisdic-
tion. 
The converse presumption also makes sense.  If Congress has not de-
signed a statutory limit as jurisdictional, then it should be presumed to be 
 
16  Id. at 2364. 
17  See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
(manuscript on file with Colloquy). 
18  See Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/07/a-sleeper-case-.html (July 9, 2007) (link). 
19  See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (link). 
20  See., e.g., Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (link); Wilson 
v. GM Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1989). 
21  See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 107.41 (3d ed. 2006); cf. Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 n.13 (1996) (referring to the one-year limit in dictum as “a nonjurisdictional 
argument”).  
22  See Dodson, supra note 17. 
23  Another is federal statutes of limitations, which the Court will address this coming Term when it 
hears John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States. 127 S. Ct. 2877 (2007) (link) (granting certiorari to 
consider whether the six-year statute of limitations in the Tucker Act is a jurisdictional limit). 
24  See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2006). 
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nonjurisdictional because a jurisdictional rule often entails heavy costs on 
the litigants and legal system.25  Jurisdiction can be raised at any time and 
obligates courts to monitor it sua sponte.  Thus, a jurisdictional defect dis-
covered well into trial causes disruption, unfairness, and tremendous waste 
of time and resources.  Withholding a jurisdictional characterization with-
out a specific designation of jurisdiction by Congress ensures that Congress 
has duly considered these costs and deemed them outweighed by the need 
for the benefits of a jurisdictional bar.26 
Bowles dispenses with these presumptions and reverses them:  statu-
tory time limits are presumed jurisdictional unless Congress says otherwise.  
That is just bad business, for at least two reasons. 
First, litigants conserve their own (and judicial) resources by contest-
ing only those issues that at least one litigant deems important enough to 
warrant litigation.  By making a host of statutory limitations jurisdictional, 
Bowles obligates the courts to investigate all of these issues sua sponte even 
if none of the litigants wish to expend effort and money on their adjudica-
tion.  And if such a limit is found to have been breached, the court must 
dismiss the case, even if the defect is found after years of costly discovery 
and trial preparation. 
Second, the rule allows a single party that recognizes a potential juris-
dictional defect to have two bites at the apple:  if she fails on the merits, she 
can raise the jurisdictional defect.  This is a real concern.  In Arbaugh v. 
Y&H Corp., for example, the defendant lost at trial and only on appeal 
raised the “jurisdictional” argument that it was never covered by the statute 
in the first place.27  And if the statutory precondition is jurisdictional, the 
party who failed to satisfy it is just as able to raise it on appeal to vacate an 
unfavorable result.  In other words, the plaintiff in Arbaugh could have 
raised the “jurisdictional” issue as well if she had been dissatisfied with her 
verdict and wanted another shot.  Bowles, by crafting a presumption that fa-
vors a jurisdictional characterization, is likely to result in a great waste of 
litigant and court resources and to encourage losing parties to raise “juris-
dictional” issues for the first time on appeal. 
III. A BETTER WAY:  MANDATORY BUT NONJURISDICTIONAL 
To avoid this tension with precedent, waste of litigant and judicial re-
sources, and unfairness, the Court should have considered characterizing 
the time limit of § 2107(c) as mandatory but nonjurisdictional.  That charac-
terization would have enabled the Court to reach the same result without 
doing violence to the nature of jurisdiction or to precedent. 
A mandatory rule restricts the discretion of the court to deviate from 
 
25  See id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. at 1238. 
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the rule when one party timely objects, but that does not mean that it is ju-
risdictional.  As the Court long ago recognized, nonjurisdictional but man-
datory legal rules have a functional role to play: 
The provision is not directory only, but mandatory to the government; and its 
purpose is to inform the defendant of the testimony which he will have to 
meet, and to enable him to prepare his defense.  Being enacted for his benefit, 
he may doubtless waive it, if he pleases; but he has a right to insist upon it, and 
if he seasonably does so, the trial cannot lawfully proceed until the require-
ment has been complied with.28 
Thus, a mandatory limit places control of its enforcement in the hands 
of the litigant whom it would benefit.  If he wishes to enforce it, he need 
only speak up in a timely manner, and the court is obligated to enforce the 
limit even if it is inequitable to do so.  Mandatory limits conserve litigant 
and judicial resources, while at the same time eliminating judicial discretion 
in determining when a limit is excusable or not.  In contrast, jurisdictional 
rules constrain the litigants as well and therefore result in greater inefficien-
cies. 
In Bowles, the Court could have construed the limit in § 2107(c) as 
merely mandatory.  That characterization would have precluded Mr. 
Bowles’ equitable “unique circumstances” excuse for his failure to meet the 
statutory time limit.  Even if inequitable, a court has no discretion to deviate 
from a properly invoked mandatory rule. 
Characterizing time limits for appeals as mandatory but nonjurisdic-
tional is in accord with the nature of jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction generally is 
founded on structural values such as federalism, separation of powers, and 
limited national government, not the litigant and systematic values of effi-
ciency, cost-effectiveness, autonomy, predictability, and fairness.  The na-
ture of jurisdiction speaks to the power of the court, not to the rights and 
obligations of parties.29 
Unlike jurisdictional rules, appeal periods involve primarily the inter-
ests of the litigants, not structural values.  They exist to promote efficiency 
in the same way that other procedural rules do.  Indeed, they are closer to 
statutes of limitation than to rules of subject-matter jurisdiction such as di-
versity jurisdiction. 
Describing appellate time limits as mandatory but nonjurisdictional has 
the added benefit of being consistent with precedent.  True, a host of Su-
preme Court cases beginning in 1960 had described those time limits as 
“mandatory and jurisdictional,”30 though the precedent was not entirely 
 
28  Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263, 304 (1892) (link). 
29  For more on how the formal nature and functional effects of jurisdiction should influence the 
framework for determining whether a limitation is jurisdictional or not, see Dodson, supra note 17. 
30  See., e.g., Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) 
(link); Browder v. Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 271–72 (1978) (link); U.S. v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 
220, 224 (1960) (link). 
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consistent.31  But, as others have explained, the outcome and reasoning in 
each case using the standard doublet “mandatory and jurisdictional” could 
have been obtained by characterizing the limit as mandatory and nonjuris-
dictional, for the only issue was whether the court had authority to relax the 
requirements after the defect had been properly and timely raised by the 
party who would benefit from the limit.32  Thus, those cases could be best 
read as holding only that the limits were mandatory, and their additional 
language of “jurisdictional” seen as rhetorical emphasis on the mandatory 
and inflexible nature of the rule.33  A mandatory but nonjurisdictional char-
acterization also would be consistent with more recent precedent, which 
trended toward nonjurisdictional characterizations.34 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bowles v. Russell is a sleeper case.  Although it seems relatively 
straightforward on the surface, it undermines precedent and lacks principled 
reasoning for its result.  As a consequence, Bowles likely will cause great 
confusion among the lower courts and litigants whenever a statutory limita-
tion issue arises.  That, in turn, will mean more litigation, more circuit 
splits, and more confusion about what limits are jurisdictional and what are 
not. 
 
31  Cf., e.g., Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 767 (2001) (link) (“[I]mperfections in noticing an 
appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment, 
to which appellate court.”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 180–81 (1962) (link) (holding that a Court of 
Appeals could not dismiss an appeal sua sponte for a violation of the rules governing notices of appeal 
when the parties fully briefed the appeal and neither party was prejudiced by the violation). 
32  Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 410 (1986). 
33  Cf. Eberhart v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 403, 406–07 (2005) (discouraging reliance on the mantra “manda-
tory and jurisdictional” as obscuring the distinction between “mandatory” and “jurisdictional”); Kon-
trick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (noting that precedent used the term “jurisdictional” to mean 
merely “emphatic”). 
34  I note that Justice Souter, in dissent, appears to misunderstand the difference between “manda-
tory” and “jurisdictional” when he writes:  “While a mandatory but nonjurisdictional limit is enforceable 
at the insistence of a party claiming its benefit or by a judge concerned with moving the docket, it may 
be waived or mitigated in exercising reasonable equitable discretion.”  Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 
2360, 2368 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  The better view is that a mandatory but nonjuris-
dictional limit is not susceptible to equitable mitigation if the party claiming its benefit timely invokes it. 
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